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I would not be a law professor if I did not quibble with the title given
this conference panel: "The President Versus the Senate in Treaty Inter-
pretation." Is the field of treaty interpretation truly witnessing a titanic,
adversarial struggle of the President versus the Senate? To me, that de-
scription seems about as accurate as characterizing what is going on in a
good marriage as "Husband Versus Wife." We all know that a marriage
contract mandates a partnership between husband and wife, with each
spouse having his or her own role, but needing the other's concurrence to
act for the family. In the same way, Article II of the Constitution man-
dates that the Senate and President act as partners in the treaty process,
with each institution fulfilling a constitutional role that cannot take effect
without the other's cooperation.' Even when particular issues prove con-
tentious, as recently occurred during the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty controversy, the two branches ultimately have little choice but to
reach some kind of political accommodation. As the final resolution of
that dispute revealed, the two branches simply need one another too
much to allow political stalemate and acrimony to persist indefinitely. 2 A
t Professor of Law, Yale Law School. This comment derives from remarks made to the
panel on "The President Versus the Senate in Treaty Interpretation: A Debate" at the Ameri-
can Bar Association Standing Committee on Law and National Security Conference on "Sepa-
ration of Powers and the Debate About Treaty Interpretation Under the Constitution," held
on March 15, 1990, in Washington, D.C.
1. See U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (The President "shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators pres-
ent concur.").
2. Following the Reagan Administration's effort to give the ABM Treaty a broad reinter-
pretation to accommodate development and testing of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI),
see infra note 12, Congress issued a threefold response. It first declared that no funds from the
1988-89 fiscal year defense appropriation could be used for new SDI tests. See National De-
fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-180, § 225, 101 Stat.
1019, 1056 (1987). The Senate then reported "The ABM Treaty Interpretation Resolution,"
which reaffirmed its understanding of the original, narrow interpretation of the ABM treaty.
See ABM Treaty Interpretation Resolution, S. Res. 167, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(l)(B), re-
printed in SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE ABM TREATY INTERPRETATION
RESOLUTION, S. REP. No. 164, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 117 (1987). The Senate then attached
to its resolution of ratification to the Treaty Between the United States and the U.S.S.R. on the
Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) the
"Biden-Byrd" condition, which specified that "the United States shall interpret the Treaty in
accordance with the common understanding of the Treaty shared by the President and the
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few highly publicized recent instances of interbranch dispute over treaty
interpretation should not overshadow more than two hundred years of
relative harmony regarding the interpretation of literally thousands of
treaties.
Unfortunately, some commentators have recently characterized the
Senate's efforts to preserve its role in treaty interpretation during the
ABM controversy as a "quest for legislative supremacy" through "pie-in-
the sky" interpretations manufactured by "ultra-whiggish" Senators and
law professors.3 Such adversarial name-calling is not only unproductive,
but needlessly exaggerates the quite narrow ground of difference that ac-
tually prevails between the two branches over the proper approach to
treaty interpretation. In fact, I would argue, far less separates the Execu-
tive and Senate positions on treaty interpretation than most commenta-
tors'would concede.
Let me demonstrate this point by considering the broad constitutional
doctrine of treaty interpretation that both branches accept. Upon reflec-
tion, that doctrine reduces to four hombook principles. First, under Ar-
ticle II, only the President has power to make a treaty for the United
States, but only if the Senate has previously advised and consented to it
by a vote of two-thirds. 4 Second, the Senate may withhold its consent to
a treaty, or it may give that consent subject to certain conditions - rang-
ing from reservations to declarations to understandings of what particu-
lar treaty terms mean. 5 Third, once the Senate has interposed its
conditions to consent, the President (or our treaty partner) may decline
to proceed with ratification. But if the President and our partner choose
to make the treaty by exchanging instruments of ratification, they can
Senate at the time the Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification." See 134 CONG. REC.
S6937 (daily ed. May 27, 1988). See generally Biden & Ritch, The Treaty Power: Upholding a
Constitutional Partnership, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1529 (1989) (recounting history of the condi-
tion). The President responded by ratifying the INF Treaty subject to that condition, but later
questioning the condition's constitutionality. See Message to the Senate on the Soviet-United
States Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty, 24 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 779, 780(June 10, 1988) [hereinafter Reagan INF Message]. See generally Koplow, Constitutional Bait
and Switch. Executive Reinterpretation of Arms Control Treaties, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1353,
1366-80 (1989).
3. See Block, Casey & Rivkin, The Senate's Pie-in-the-Sky Treaty Interpretation: Power
and the Quest for Legislative Supremacy, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1481, 1482 (1989) [hereinafter
Block]. For a more recent statement of these authors' views, see Block & Rivkin, Legislative
Power Grab: The Anti-Federalist Counter-revolution in the Making, N.Y. REv. Bgs., May 17,
1990, at 50.
4. See supra note 1.
5. See Haver v. Yaker, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 32, 35 (1869); Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United
States, 183 U.S. 176, 183 (1901) (Brown, J., concurring); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 314 (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
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only make the treaty to which the Senate has advised and consented. 6 In
short, under United States law, the President is bound - both at the
time of ratification and after - to honor the conditions upon which the
Senate has based its consent.
Fourth and finally, the President thereafter has general authority to
interpret treaties as law for the United States, subject to two simple, but
important constraints. He may not reinterpret the treaty so as to make
it a wholly different treaty from the one to which the Senate originally
advised and consented. That Would de facto amend the treaty - and
make a new treaty in violation of Article II - without the consent of
either the Senate or our treaty partner. Moreover, the President must
remember that the final authority to interpret the treaty rests neither
with him nor with the Senate, but with the judiciary, the third branch of
government left curiously unmentioned by our panel title. Article III of
the Constitution (not to mention Marbury v. Madison)7 settled that the
courts, not the President or the Senate, bear the final authority to decide
cases and controversies arising under treaties made by the United States.8
Once the Supreme Court has ruled on a matter of treaty interpretation,
its ruling is authoritative as United States law and binds the political
branches of the federal government, as well as all lower courts and the
states. 9
These principles should surprise no one. Indeed, in a recent book, I
argue that all foreign affairs decisions in this country are governed by
similar rules of constitutional law - deriving from the Constitution's
structure and text, judicial decisions, framework statutes, and institu-
tional practice - which jointly comprise what I call "The National Se-
curity Constitution."10 The driving principle of that National Security
Constitution is that checks and balances do not stop at the water's edge.
The foreign affairs power, like all governmental power in this country, is
6. For a restatement of this principle, see section 2(1)(B) of the ABM Treaty Interpreta-
tion Resolution, supra note 2 ("If, following Senate advice and consent, the President proceeds
to ratify a treaty, the President may ratify only the treaty to which the Senate advised and
consented.").
7. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically, the province and duty of the
judicial department, to say what the law is.").
8. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
9. See, eg., Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986)
("the courts have the authority to construe treaties and executive agreements"); Jones v.
Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 32 (1899) ("The construction of treaties is the peculiar province of the
judiciary"). In construing treaties, United States courts tend to give great, but not conclusive,
weight to interpretations offered by the Executive Branch. See, eg., Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc.
v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 326(2).
10. H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE
IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 67-72 (1990).
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not exclusively Presidential, but rather, a power shared among the three
branches of our federal government. The broader point of the four prin-
ciples just outlined is that our National Security Constitution does not
repose the power of treaty interpretation solely in any one branch. In-
stead, it allocates that power among all three branches, subject to a finely
wrought system of institutional checks and balances.
If we can agree upon these four basic principles of treaty interpretation
- Presidential power to make a treaty subject to Senate consent, senato-
rial power to condition its consent, Presidential power to make only the
treaty consented to, and judicial power of final interpretation - then
what's all the fuss about? The ABM Treaty fight, it seems to me, re-
volved around the third principle: that once the Senate has given its
conditional consent, the President can only make the treaty to which the
Senate has advised and consented, namely, the treaty as the consenting
Senate understood it to mean. The ABM dispute raised this question:
how do we know what the Senate understood a particular treaty to
mean?
Again, no real dispute existed over at least half of the answer. All
sides agreed that if the text of a particular treaty provision proves ambig-
uous, but the Senate formally declares its understanding of the provi-
sion's meaning at the time it consented - for example, by attaching an
understanding to its resolution of ratification to the treaty - then the
President must honor that formal understanding." The ABM contro-
versy arose over the informal, not the formal, half of the answer. Sup-
pose ambiguity exists as to what the text of the treaty means, and the
Senate does not formally declare its understanding of the provision's
meaning when it consents? Must the President honor the Senate's com-
plete understanding of a treaty, including its implicit understandings of
particular provisions that were not formalized into writing? And can a
third party - for example, a court or a treaty partner - look outside the
text of the treaty to determine the Senate's complete understanding of a
provision?
During the ABM treaty interpretation debate, the so-called pro-Con-
gress advocates generally answered yes to these questions. Many pro-
Executive commentators answered them in the negative. But in my view,
one need not choose which end of Pennsylvania Avenue one favors to
reach the legal conclusions that the President must honor the Senate's
complete, shared understanding of a treaty and that one may divine that
shared understanding by looking to extratextual materials. These con-
11. Compare Block, supra note 3, at 1486 with Koplow, supra note 2, at 1401-06.
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clusions are neither pro-Congress nor pro-Executive. They are pro-Con-
stitution, or just common sense.
Let me explain with an example from my everyday life. About a year
ago, my three-and-one-half year old daughter Emily and I agreed that
she could not drink soda without the consent of her mother or me. One
day last week, she told me that she and a friend had agreed to get drinks
from "the green bottle in the refrigerator." She asked, "is that okay?"
After long shared experience, she knew, and I knew, and she knew I
knew that we were both referring to the green bottle of orange juice n the
refrigerator. And so I consented. Now if she and her friend then went to
the refrigerator and drank from a green bottle of soda, or for that matter
a green bottle of vodka, would she have breached our accord? Common
sense would say yes, because even if she did not violate the literal words
of our agreement, she would have violated our implicit common under-
standing regarding the scope of my consent. Had that occurred, I might
also have been at fault, for failing to specify "you may drink from the
green bottle containing orange juice and no other green bottle." But per-
haps I would have thought that level of specificity unnecessary, because I
knew of no other green bottles in the refrigerator. The main point is that
I consented only to one act - namely, drinking orange juice. The act
that I understood her to be contemplating was the only act that I author-
ized her to take.
This simple common sense principle also guides our constitutional law
of treaty interpretation. When President Nixon asked the Senate in 1972
to consent to a treaty limiting the production of anti-ballistic missiles -
a treaty the broad purpose of which was to prevent either party from
creating territorial defense systems against strategic offensive missiles -
and the Senate gave its consent, it authorized only the treaty it under-
stood the President to be contemplating. When President Reagan pur-
ported to reinterpret particular words of that agreement to authorize
development and testing of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) - pre-
cisely the kind of territorial defense system the ABM Treaty proscribed
- he violated the two branches' prior shared understanding of what had
been authorized. 12 Perhaps the Senate, like me, was at fault for not speci-
fying in greater detail what it was consenting to, but as the recent Biden-
Byrd condition to the INF Treaty suggests, the Senate will not likely
12. In article I of the ABM Treaty the parties generally agreed "to limit anti-ballistic
missile (ABM) systems" and "not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its
country and not to provide a base for such a defense." Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-
Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503,
reprinted in Il I.L.M. 784 (1972). In article V, the parties further undertook "not to develop,
test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or
335
Yale Journal of International Law Vol. 15:331, 1990
make that political mistake again.1 3 But the legal point is the same as in
the orange juice example: the Senate consented only to the treaty that it
understood the President to contemplate - a treaty barring territorial
defense systems - and the treaty it understood was the only one it au-
thorized the President to make. If a subsequent President tries, through
the guise of reinterpretation, to claim that the Senate in fact authorized a
different treaty, then he is trying to amend the treaty without Senate ad-
vice and consent, violating the last of the four basic principles that I
outlined earlier.
Executive branch supporters have lodged two objections against this
conclusion, neither of which proves persuasive upon examination. The
first is that even if one can know what an individual implicitly under-
stands, one cannot know what the Senate as a whole intended a treaty to
mean except by looking at the treaty's text.14 Yet this objection raises a
problem of proof, not a dispute over legal principle. The objection is not
that implicit Senate intent does not count, only that one cannot easily
determine what legislative bodies implicitly intended. Yet however diffi-
cult it may be to glean legislative intent, that task is one that courts
tackle every day when they are asked to divine statutory intent by con-
struing legislative histories. If a court can construe a statute by deducing
Congress' implicit intent from extratextual sources, such as report lan-
guage and floor colloquies, there seems no reason why third parties can-
not similarly construe the Senate's intent underlying a treaty by looking
to the same sources.15
mobile land-based." (emphasis added). The only ABM systems permitted by the treaty were
two (later, one) fixed land-based systems described in article Ill.
The Reagan Administration's 1985 reinterpretation of the treaty claimed first, that article
V's ban on the development, testing, and deployment of space-based ABM systems applied
only to technologies that were "current" as of 1972, and second, that Agreed Statement D of
the treaty permitted the development and testing (but not the deployment) of mobile ABM
systems and components based on "other physical principles." See Sofaer, The ABM Treaty
and the Strategic Defense Initiative, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1972 (1986). The Reagan Administra-
tion's reading of the treaty clashed with that held by all but one of the senior members of the
delegation that negotiated the treaty, President Nixon himself, numerous Soviet officials and
U.S. Senators, and many academic commentators. See generally R. GARTHOFF, POLICY VER-
sus THE LAW: THE REINTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY (1987); Koplow, supra note
2, at 1370-71 & nn.73-76 (1989) (cataloging critics of the reinterpretation).
13. See supra note 2. It remains to be seen whether the Senate will see fit to insert the
Biden-Byrd Condition as boilerplate onto all future arms control treaties.
14. See, e.g., Block, supra note 3, at 1501-03.
15. A variant of this objection is that enforcing the Senate's implicit understanding of a
treaty upon the President would give undue legal effect to unenacted legislative statements,
which must be embodied in a formal resolution of ratification to have any legal significance.
See, e.g., Block, supra note 3, at 1502 ("Even if intent can be proven beyond all doubt, it does
not control. It is the actual language of the enacted legislation that is the law, not the
unenacted intent of the legislators.") (emphasis added). Yet a court no more gives legal effect
to unenacted legislative statements when it construes a treaty in light of Senate debates than it
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The second objection, sometimes called the "two treaties" problem,
charges that the principles above will create two treaties, one that the
President makes with the Soviets and another that the President makes
with the Senate, potentially subjecting the United States to different or
conflicting interpretations. 16 Yet the problem is misnamed. In fact there
are never two treaties. There is only one: the single treaty that the Presi-
dent and our treaty partner make after the Senate has given its consent.
If the President's understanding of a treaty does not match the Senate's,
he is free to reject the Senate's resolution of ratification and leave the
treaty unratified. What he lacks the freedom to do is to ratify the treaty
subject to those conditions, then to reinterpret it inconsistently with
them.
Again this is just common sense. When my wife and I sign a contract
to sell to a third party a house that we jointly own, the "sellers' intent" is
ours, not mine or hers alone. In the same way, the intent of the "United
States" as a party to the treaty refers not to the intent of the President
when he transmits the treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent, but
to the common intent of the Senate and President manifested after the
Senate has returned the treaty to the President and the President has
ratified it subject to the Senate's conditions. For the President to claim a
sweeping power of treaty reinterpretation after ratification would be akin
to the President signing a statute, then subsequently construing its terms
to mean their opposite.
It remains possible, of course, that the one treaty that the United
States and -its treaty partner make will create differing domestic and in-
ternational legal obligations. Hence, this problem is not so much one of
"two treaties," as of the same treaty giving rise to differing obligations.
But the key point is that the executive branch can both create and allevi-
ate this "differing obligations" problem. Differing obligations arise only
if the Executive - who serves as the go-between between the Senators
and the Soviets - tells the Senate that a provision means one thing, then
tells the Soviets the provision means something else. The most simple
and obvious way to minimize the differing obligations problem is for the
President to give both the Senate and the Soviets the same explanation of
each treaty provision. 17
does when it construes a statute in light of its legislative history. In both cases, the court is not
giving legal force to stray legislative comments; it is looking to those remarks to determine
what the legislative body as a whole intended when it passed the resolution of ratification or
the statute that constituted the operative legal document.
16. See, eg., Biden & Ritch, supra note 2, at 1543-44 (describing "two treaties" problem).
17. It is the Executive's responsibility to ensure sufficient clarity in a treaty and in its
explanations thereof to the Senate so that no conflict exists between the shared under-
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Moreover, as any international lawyer knows, there is nothing unusual
about a state assuming differing domestic and international legal obliga-
tions under a treaty. That problem recurs regularly, as for example,
when Congress and the President enact implementing legislation that
does not fully execute the terms of a nonself-executing treaty. Differing
domestic and international legal obligations will almost inevitably arise
in an international system where government officials are subject to both
domestic and international legal obligations, and where treaty partners
ratify the same treaty by different domestic processes. Nor is there any
real dispute under United States law about how such differing obligations
should be handled. If following a requirement of our domestic constitu-
tional law would place the United States in violation of international law,
it is well settled that United States officials must follow domestic law, and
answer for any resulting international violation in an international
forum.18
All of this strikes me as quite straightforward. The hard question is
not whether we are constitutionally obliged to determine the President's
and the Senate's shared understanding of a treaty, but how we are to do
so. In particular, what evidence may we look at to divine that under-
standing? Are we restricted to the text alone, or may we also look to
extratextual materials to determine the Senate's complete and shared un-
derstanding of a treaty? Three possibilities immediately come to mind.
First, can we look to the negotiating history of the treaty, which may be
massive, classified, fragmentary, a hodge-podge, or just unavailable? Sec-
ond, what weight, if any, should we give representations made by execu-
tive branch officials to the Senate during the advice and consent process,
but before ratification? And third, may we glean the Senate's under-
standing by looking at other preratification materials that were before the
Senate when it consented, in particular, records of internal Senate delib-
erations or speeches made by particular Senators?
If our goal is interpretation, the short answer is that under both inter-
national and domestic law, we can and should consult such materials.
As a matter of international law, the so-called New Haven School of
jurisprudence has long argued that treaties should be interpreted by ex-
amination of context as well as text. As Myres McDougal, Harold Lass-
standing of the parties on the one hand and the shared understanding of the Executive
and the Senate on the other.
SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE INF TREATY, S. EXEC. REP. No. 15, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 103 (1988) [hereinafter INF REPORT].
18. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § l15(1)(b) ("That ... a provision of an
international agreement is superseded as domestic law does not relieve the United States of its
international obligation or of the consequences of a violation of that obligation.").
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well, and James Miller declared in 1967, "[i]t is the grossest, least
defensible exercise of arbitrary formalism to arrogate to one particular
set of signs - the text of a document - the role of serving as the exclu-
sive index of the parties' shared expectations." 19
As a matter of domestic constitutional law, the same point holds, be-
ginning with negotiating history. Although what constitutes negotiating
history may not always be clear, the question of when we may look at it
seems quite easy. As in the case of legislative history, we may look to
available portions of the negotiating history when the text of the treaty is
ambiguous - i.e., whenever two interpretations of the same language are
possible - and when those portions were before the Senate at the time it
gave its consent. In determining the effect of a treaty under domestic law,
the key issue should not be the intent of the treaty negotiators, but
rather, the intent of the Senate when it consented to ratification of all or
part of what the treaty negotiators agreed upon. To return to my earlier
example, we do not determine whether I gave my consent to Emily and
her friend to drink vodka from a green bottle by looking at what she
hoped I would agree to (or what she and her friend agreed upon hoping
that I would agree to). Instead we look to what I actually intended to
authorize her to do, and what information was before me when I gave my
authorization, because (like the Senate) I am the one whose consent she
needed to take action.
What this means for the ABM Treaty reinterpretation debate is that
the Reagan Administration could not lawfully base a new interpretation
of particular provisions of the Treaty upon a secret negotiating history
that the ratifying executive branch never revealed to the consenting Sen-
ate back in 1972. We should no more permit a treaty to be construed
based on a previously secret negotiating history than we would permit
the text of a statute to be construed in light of a previously secret legisla-
tive history. In both cases, that secret history did not form a part of the
record upon which the legislators voted, and their votes, not the negotia-
tors' intentions, formed the legally decisive acts. 20
In any event, both judicial decision and executive practice now seem
largely to have settled this issue. In Air France v. Saks,21 the Supreme
Court declared that "[iln interpreting a treaty it is proper, of course, to
19. M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & J. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREE-
MENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER xvii (1967).
20. See The ABM Treaty and the Constitution: Joint Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations and the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 412, 416-17
(1987) [hereinafter Joint Hearings] (statement of Professor Laurence H. Tribe).
21. 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
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refer to the records of its drafting and negotiation." 22 The executive
branch also seems to have acquiesced in this view, having declassified
and waived executive privilege on much of the negotiating history of the
ABM Treaty during the reinterpretation dispute, and by providing the
Senate with access to all thirty-one bound volumes of the negotiating
history of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty during
the debate over that treaty's ratification. 23
With regard to the second type of extratextual evidence - executive
branch representations to the Senate - pro-Executive commentators
continue to defend in theory absolutist positions that the executive
branch itself has already renounced in practice. In March 1987, then-
State Department Legal Adviser Abraham Sofaer appeared to adopt
such an absolutist position when he testified that "[w]hen it [the Senate]
gives its advice and consent to a treaty, it is to the treaty that was made,
irrespective of the explanations it is provided."24 The absoluteness of his
language - which implied both that the President can "make" a treaty
before receiving senatorial advice and consent and that the executive
branch is not bound by what it tells a consenting Senate a treaty means
before ratifieation - soon gave rise to the term "Sofaer Doctrine. ' 25 But
like George Kennan's "containment doctrine," that term has now come
to stand for something far more absolute than its author originally in-
tended.26 The "Sofaer Doctrine" now stands as shorthand for the propo-
sition that, generally speaking, one should not look beyond the text of the
treaty itself and the accompanying resolution of ratification to determine
what the Senate intended. Insofar as Justice Scalia's recent opinion con-
curring in the judgment in United States v. Stuart 27 implies that he, too,
might take this absolutist position, perhaps it should be renamed the
"Scalia Doctrine. '28
22. Id. at 400. See also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243,
259 (1984) (looking to minutes of Warsaw Convention to resolve textual ambiguities).
23. See Reagan INF Message, supra note 2, at 780 ("we provided detailed written answers
to over 1,300 questions for the record from the Committees and individual Senators; and we
provided access to the negotiating record of the Treaty, comprising 31 bound volumes"); Koh,
Nowak, Rees & Sofaer, The Treaty Power, 43 U. MIAMI L. REv. 101, 113-14 (Koh) (1988)
(describing waiver of executive privilege on ABM Treaty negotiating documents).
24. Joint Hearings, supra note 20, at 130 (emphasis added). See also id. (response of Sena-
tor Biden: "Would you say that again? ... That is incredible. That is absolutely staggering.").
25. See INF REPORT, supra note 17, at 90-96; Biden & Ritch, supra note 2, at 1536-44
(describing contours of the doctrine).
26. See Sofaer, Treaty Interpretation: A Comment, 137 U. PA. L. Rav. 1437, 1437 (1989)
("The alleged 'Sofaer doctrine' is no more than a polemical device, utilized in a political con-
troversy, and has never had any basis in fact.").
27. 109 S. Ct. 1183 (1989).
28. See id. at 1193 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (criticizing majority for inter-
preting United States-Canada tax treaty by looking outside its text to preratification Senate
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Regardless of terminology, two key points emerge. First, as a matter
of executive practice, the White House, the Justice Department, and to
some extent Judge Sofaer himself have now renounced this absolutist po-
sition.29 Second, no court has yet accepted the strict Sofaer Doctrine, and
at least one has squarely rejected it.30 In March 1988, then-White House
Counsel A.B. Culvahouse, Jr. sent a letter to Senator Richard Lugar in
connection with the ratification of the INF Treaty conceding that the
Executive would be bound under domestic law by an interpretation
"authoritatively" presented to the Senate by the executive branch, but
only if three "Culvahouse Conditions" were met: the interpretation
was "clearly intended, generally understood and relied upon by, the Sen-
ate" at the time of its advice and consent. 31 Judge Sofaer himself also
embraced those conditions, confirming "the President's duty to consider
and, at times, to be bound by Executive Branch representations to the
Senate." 32
The executive branch's suggestion that one can objectively determine
what the Senate as a whole "clearly intended, generally understood and
relied upon" at the time of advice and consent undercuts its earlier sug-
gestion that the President cannot be bound by what the entire Senate
implicitly understood a treaty to mean, because such implicit under-
standings cannot be gleaned. Even more important, however, in series of
interbranch communications, various executive branch officials have dis-
tanced themselves from the Culvahouse Conditions.
In his June 1988 statement regarding the Biden-Byrd condition to the
INF Treaty, President Reagan made no mention of the Culvahouse Con-
ditions when he declared:
With respect to U.S. law, the President must respect the mutual under-
standings reached with the Senate during the advice and consent pro-
cess.... Executive statements should be given binding weight only when
materials). Justice Scalia's position in Stuart comports with his disdain for reliance on ex-
tratextual materials in statutory cases. See generally Fein, Scalia's Way, ABA J., Feb. 1990, at
38; Biskupic, Scalia Takes a Narrow View in Seeking Congress' Will, 48 CONG. Q. 913 (1990).
29. Executive practice, conducted over a course of time with congressional knowledge and
acquiescence, acquires legal force as customary constitutional law. See generally H. KOH,
supra note 10, at 70-71 (discussing concept of "quasi-constitutional custom"). Accord,
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
30. See Rainbow Navigation, Inc. v. Dep't of the Navy, 699 F. Supp. 339 (D.D.C. 1988),
appeal pending, Nos. 89-5019, -5020 (D.C. Cir. argued Mar. 6, 1990).
31. Letter from Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr., Counsel to the President, to Hon. Richard G.
Lugar (March 17, 1988), reprinted in INF REPORT, supra note 17, at 443, 444. The
Culvahouse letter purported to reflect the views of the legal offices of the Departments of State
and Defense, the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice, the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, and the National Security Council. See id at 445.
32. Sofaer, supra note 26, at 1440-41.
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they were authoritatively communicated to the Senate by the Executive and
were part of the basis on which the Senate granted its advice and consent to
ratification. 3 3
In Rainbow Navigation, Inc. v. Dep't of the Navy,34 now pending before
the District of Columbia Circuit, the Justice Department similarly
dropped the Culvahouse Conditions. The Department conceded that au-
thoritative representations made by executive officials to the Senate when
it gave its consent to a United States-Iceland navigation treaty were not
merely precatory, but "entitled to be accorded binding weight as a matter
of domestic constitutional law, and the Executive branch fully accepts
that it is bound by such statements. ' 35 The district court accepted those
representations, expressing "no doubt about the obligation of the Execu-
tive Branch to stand behind the representations made by its officials to
the Senate committee having jurisdiction. '36
Given that the branches now apparently agree that the only negotiat-
ing history that counts is that shown to the Senate before it consents, and
that the President has agreed to be bound by authoritative treaty inter-
pretations that his officials have shared with the Senate, only one real
ground of controversy remains: whether statements that Senators them-
selves make during the course of advice-and-consent deliberations may
be consulted by a court, or other third parties, in determining a treaty's
meaning.
Upon examination, however, this point, too, has now been conclu-
sively resolved by judicial decision. In United States v. Stuart, decided
just last year, six members of the Supreme Court (including, significantly,
Chief Justice Rehnquist) declared that "[n]ontextual sources . . . often
assist us in 'giving effect to the intent of the Treaty parties,' such as a
treaty's ratification history and its subsequent operation. ' 37 In a foot-
note, the Court denied that "reliance on the Senate's preratification de-
bates and reports [is] improper .... the American Law Institute's most
recent Restatement counsels consideration of such materials [and
c]onsultation of these materials is eminently reasonable. '38 Justice
Scalia's solo concurrence objected that he had "been unable to discover a
single case in which this Court has consulted the Senate debate, commit-
33. Reagan INF Message, supra note 2, at 780.
34. 699 F. Supp. 339 (D.D.C. 1988), appeal pending, Nos. 89-5019, -5020 (D.C. Cir. ar-
gued Mar. 6, 1990).
35. See id. at 343, citing from Defendants' Reply Brief and Opposition to Plaintiff's Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment at 2 n.2.
36. 699 F. Supp. at 343.
37. 109 S. Ct. 1183, 1191 (1989) (citations omitted).
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tee hearings or committee reports" to interpret a treaty.39 But as Profes-
sor Detlev Vagts recently pointed out in a devastating rejoinder, the good
Justice simply had not looked hard enough5 ° Professor Vagts found at
least seven Supreme Court cases in the last forty years in which the
Court had done just that, including two cases that were decided while
Justice Scalia was sitting on the Court.4 1 Nor can one simply dismiss the
Court's statements in Stuart as either dicta or stray language in a foot-
note. After all, the executive branch has never hesitated to rely on simi-
lar dicta in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,42 which
declared the President to be the "sole organ of the federal government in
the field of international relations," and the Court's entire modern equal
protection doctrine has been built upon its famous fourth footnote in
United States v. Carolene Prod. Co.43
Professor Abram Chayes enjoys telling the story of the Southern Bap-
tist minister who when asked, "Do you believe in total immersion bap-
tism?" answers, "Believe in it? I've seen it done." If the question is "do
you believe that the Supreme Court can consult extratextual materials,
including Senate preratification materials, to determine the domestic ef-
fect of a treaty?" the answer is we've seen it done, not just once but
repeatedly. And because one of the four hornbook principles listed ear-
lier is that the Supreme Court, not the President or the Senate, has the
last word on treaty interpretation, the Court's willingness to refer to ex-
tratextual materials must be treated as authoritative.
To summarize, then, despite the political furor that the ABM interpre-
tation controversy raised, its aftermath has resolved most of the out-
standing legal issues. Both branches accept four basic principles of treaty
interpretation - Presidential power to make a treaty subject to Senate
consent, senatorial power to condition its consent, Presidential power to
make only the particular treaty consented to, and judicial power of final
interpretation. While some still-quarrel over two much narrower ques-
tions - whether the President must honor the understanding of a treaty
39. 109 S. Ct. at 1195 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
40. Vagts, Senate Materials and Treaty Interpretation: Some Research Hints for the
Supreme Court, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 546 (1989).
41. See id. at 547 n.5, citing, inter alia, Volkwagenwerk A.G. v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694,
108 S. Ct. 2104, 2110, 2113, 2115-16 (1988) and Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v.
United States Dist. Ct., 482 U.S. 522, 107 S. Ct. 2542, 2549, 2559 (1987).
42. 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936). For discussion and criticism of the Curtiss- Wright dicta,
known to government lawyers as the " 'Curtiss- Wright, so I'm right' cite," see H. KOH, supra
note 10, at 93-96 & nn.122, 126.
43. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRuST (1980);
L. LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT? (1975); Balkin, The Footnote, 83 Nw. U.L. REv. 275, 281 n.16
(1989) (collecting citations to articles citing footnote four).
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that the Senate shares, and whether one may divine that understanding
by looking to materials outside the text of the treaty - both questions
have now, through executive practice and judicial decision, been substan-
tially settled in the Senate's favor. To my mind, this result is not just
good constitutional law. It makes good common sense. And if we can
all agree on that, then perhaps my fellow panelists and I can simply ad-
journ to the lounge for a glass of orange juice - with vodka, if they'd
like.
344
Vol. 15:331, 1990
